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Ambiguityf Incoherence and Evaluation in 
Constitutional Theory1 
David Lyons 
An observation made several years ago by Robert Bork still seems 
sound today: 
A persistently disturbing aspect of constirutiona[ law is its 
lack of theory, a lade which is manifest not merely in the 
work of the courts but in the public, professional and even 
scholarly discussion of the topic. 2 
It is not that we lack the trappings of theoretical enterprise. When 
Bork remarked about the dearth of theory, he knew that learned 
books and journals devoted much space to scholarly writing about 
constitutional law, dealing with such formidable topics as "the 
counter-majoritarian difficulty" and "principled adjudication," just as 
they now discuss at length the merits of "interpretive," "noninterpre­
tive" and "proces5'based" theories of judicial review. (By "judicial 
review" I mean, of course, the review of governmental decisions to 
determine whether they should be nullified for violating constitu­
tional limits.) Theorizing: about judicial review - the focus of consti­
tutional scholarship done by lawyers - was a major industry long 
before the current constitutional bicentennial. 
Bork complained of the lack of theory. I would put the matter dif­
ferently. Our theoretical efforts too infrequently illuminate the issues; 
in fact, we sometimes seem awash with constitutional confusion. 
Bork's own work illustrates the point - especially his important 
paper, "Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems," 
which often was referred to in the Senate Judiciary Committee's hear­
ings on (then Judge) Bork's nomination to the Supreme Court. The 
Committee was concerned not only that Bork's views diverged signifi­
cantly from the Court's but most especially that he was committed to 
undermining established lines of interpretative precedent on such 
matters as the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of "the equal pro­
tection of the laws.,, 
My concern is somewhat different. Bork's essay is one of the most 
frequently cited in constitutional scholarship. It seems widely 
regarded as a skillful and sophisticated application of philosophical 
doctrines. That fact alone will suggest the underdeveloped condition 
of constitutional theory. 
I. Moral Skepticism 
The main focus of Bork's "Neutral Principles" paper is "the proper 
role of the Supreme Court" ( p. 1 ): "The Supreme Court is a major 
power center, and we must ask when its power should be used and 
when it should be withheld" (p. 2). His concern is "legitimate author­
ity" (p. 3 ); he develops and defends a "theory of judicial obligation" 
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(p. 4 ). I have emphasized certain of Bork's words because they indi­
cate, without distortion; that the issue addressed is not narrowly legal. 
It is not a matter of what the law. for better or worse. requires. It is. 
rather, a problem of political morality - how judges. who have 
accepted a public trust, should view their role. and how they can. in 
good conscience, function in their offices. 
According to Bork, the central task of the Court in constitutional 
cases is to clarify the line between majority rule and individual free­
dom. He treats this as equivalent to making a "value choice" between 
"gratifications." He writes: 
Every clash between a minority claiming freedom and a 
majority claiming power to regulate involves a choice 
between the gratifications of the two groups. When the 
Constitution has not spoken, the Court will be able to find 
no scale, other than its own value preferences, upon which 
to weigh the respective claims to pleasure. (p. 9) 
Within the context of Bork's argument, his meaning is quite clear: the 
majority's assertion of a right to regulate and the minority's assertion 
of a right to be free from such regulation are, at bottom, "claims to 
pleasure"; and any judgment of the respective merits of these compet­
ing assertions amounts to a rationally arbitrary "value choice." Bork 
does not mean that those particular claims about majority and minor .. 
ity rights suffer peculiar deficiencies. Nor does he mean merely that, 
due to human limitations, value judgments are often biased or are 
otherwise prone to error. His point is that such claims are essentially 
insupportable. Their deficiency is an inevitable consequence of their 
ethical character. He explains: 
There is no principled way to decide that one man's grati­
fications are more deserving of respect than another's or 
that one form of gratification is more worthy than 
another .... There is no way of deciding these matters other 
than by reference to some system of moral or ethical 
values that has no objective or intrinsic validity of its own 
and about which men can and do differ. (p. 10) 
Bork's point seems to be that no rationally respectable reasons can 
support the claim that, on a particular issue, the majority's position is 
sound, and thus that the majority may justifiably impose its will on a 
resisting minority; and that no rationally respectable reasons can sup­
port the contrary judgment, that the majority's claim is unsound, and 
thus that the majority's imposing its will on the resisting minority 
would be unjustified. 
Bork infers from this that "Courts must accept any value choice the 
legislature makes unless it clearly runs contrary to a choice made in 
the framing of the Constitution" (pp. lQ,11 ). 
Philosophers will recognize the chief premise of Bork's argument. It 
is a deep philosophical skepticism about value judgments, the idea 
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that ethical judgments are irremediably arbitrary, rationally indefensi­
ble. On that basis, he argues that judges ar1e duty-bound to refrain 
from basing decisions on fresh value judgments. 
Bork's overall argument is self-defeating. He defends a theory of 
judicial obligation with the clear implication that he is demonstrating 
its superiority to competing theories. In so arguing, he does not tt1eat 
alternative approaches to judicial review as equally valid; he treats 
them as mistaken. But, according to Borkts theory about ethics, any 
moral controversy amounts to a clash between incompatible gratifica­
tions or claims to pleasure. According to his theory, defending an eth­
ical judgment against contrary judgments amounts to treating one·s 
own gratification as more worthy than others' competing gratifica­
tions. Bork denies that such judgments can be "principled"; they can 
be defended only within the ccnfines of a value system the premises 
of which are fundamentally arbitrary. In defending his own theory of 
judicial obligation, however, he argues as if a particular .. value 
choice" is rationally preferable to the alternatives. But his ethical skep­
ticism says this is impossible. 
One might wish to challenge Bork's conception of ethics. But my 
point just now is to emphasize that no theory of judicial obligation or 
of the legitimate exercise of judicial authority can be built upon ethi­
cal skepticism, as Bork pretends to do. Indeed, I do not see how one 
can consistently combine ethical skepticism with the claim that a par­
tkular theory of obligation is sound. 
As I mentioned above, Bork claims that "Courts must accept any 
value choice the legislature makes unless it clearly runs contrary to a 
choice made in the framing of the Constitution" (pp. 10- 1 1 ). He thus 
suggests that his skepticism applies only to fresh value judgments 
made by judges and to judicial decisions that rely on such value judg­
ments. He appears to believe that judicial decisions can be "prin­
cipled" if judges make no "value choices" of their own and confine 
themselves to implementing the "value choices" that have already 
been made by the framers and embedded in the Constitution. 
But that will not work.. Bork's argument involves skepticism about 
ethical judgments as such. It implies that all "value choices" are inher­
ently arbitrary. It therefore implies that the "value choices" 
embedded in the Constitution are inherently arbitrary. If "value choi­
ces" are "unprincipled;' then so were the choices made by and 
embedded into the Constitution by the "framers," and so are all judi .. 
cial decisions that are grounded on the Constitution's principles. 
One cannot have it both ways. Bork's theoretical position as well as 
his basic position regarding judicial review are profoundly incoherent. 
II. Strict construction 
Unfortunately, this example of constitutional theorizing gone awry ts 
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no exception, but is closer to the rule. Consider the familiar claim 
that judges should ''sttictly construe" constitutional provisions. 
Sometimes, the call for "strict construction" must be understood as 
empty rhetoric, urging stria adherence to the Constitution, and mark­
ing disagreement over its proper interpTetation. At other times. how­
ever, the call for ,. sttict construction" suggests the doctrine that 
judges should interpret constitutional provisions narrou.{y. This is not 
empty rhetoric - but it is problematic counsel. 
Some provisions of the Constitution confer power or authority on 
the federal government, such as the legislative, executive, and judicial 
powers oonferred by the first three articles. Other provisions, most 
notably amendments, such as the Bill of Rights, limit those very pow­
ers. Try now to imagine ustrictly," i.e .• narrowly, construing constitu­
tional provisions generally. To consttue governmental powers nar­
rowly is to imply that those powers have correspondingly broad 
limits. To construe limits on governmental powers narrowly is to 
imply that the powers are correspondingly broad. So the call for 
"strict construction," meaning narrow construction, is one that judges 
cannot consistently respect. To call for a general strategy of "strict 
construction," in this sense, is to ask for the impossible. 
Ill. Original Intent 
Or take the notion that judges should respect "original intent. "3 
There are, of course, practical obstacles to discovering "original 
intent" and thus to applying this approach to constitutional interpre­
tation. We often do not know enough about the intentions of those 
who were responsible for giving us the Constitution. Those who 
created the Constitution did not always agree enough to generate a 
collective intent on every point. The most committed partisans of 
"intentionalism" agree that such practical difficulties can be 
formidable. 
But the theory faces deeper difficulties that are not generally 
acknowledged. ( 1) There is a prima fade case against it, and ( 2) it is 
inherently ambiguous. One who urges courts to follow "original 
intent" owes us a reason why, and the explanation must clarify the 
theory. As the appeal to "original intent" now stands, it is either too 
ambiguous to be followed or its use cites some evidence about "origi­
nal intent," in effect ignoring its ambiguity and interpreting it 
arbitrarily. 
( 1) Someone can intelligibly question whether I meant what I said -
whether mJ meaning corresponds to the meaning of what l said. This is 
possible because the words that we use have meaning that is quite 
independent of our personal intentions. The meaning of what I said 
must be distinguished from "what I had in mind" when I said it -not 
only from my specific thoughts at the time, but also from what I 
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meant to say, and from the reasons that I had for uttering those 
words. 
By the same token, the meaning of a rexr must be distinguished 
from the various things that may be intended by "original intent." 
Like the meaning of what I say, the meaning of a text that I write is 
determined principally by social, linguistic convention. An author 
utilizes those conventions in order to express some ideas. and often to 
do other things as well. Now, the Constitution has an authoritative 
text, which has some considerable meaning. That meaning is distin­
guishable from "what its authors had in mind" - from their specific 
thoughts at the time, from the thoughts that they meant to express, 
and from the reasons that they had for doing what they did - none 
of which (unlike the text) was ever the object of ratification; none of 
which has any authoritative, official status. 
It would seem to follow that intentionalism is either a problematic 
theory about the meaning of the Constitution or else a problematic 
theory calling upon judges to ignore the Constitution's meaning. 
Either way, it requires justification. 
(2) The appeal to "original intent" is also ambiguous; it is subject 
to distinct, incompatible interpretations. Whose intentions count? Are 
we to be guided by the intentions of those who drafted the text - the 
"framers"? By the intentions of those who initially approved the text -
the signers? By the intentions of those who played a formal role in the 
subsequent ratification process - the ratifiers?4 Or are we to be 
guided by the intentions of those who are credited by the text itself 
with establishing the Constitution - the "People"?5 Something might 
be said for each of these answers. And, insofar as the intentions of the 
various groups differ, it would be impossible to follow all of them, 
and it is therefore impossible to follow intentionalism unless the the­
ory is refined. 
Intentions have at least one other relevant dimension, and, as the 
two dimensions intersect, the theory's ambiguity multiplies dramati­
cally. The intentionalist must tell us, not only whose intentions count, 
but also which of the various states of mind that might be considere.d 
is to count. To simplify matters, I shall illustrate this aspect of inten­
tionalism 's ambiguity using just two competing versions of the theory, 
and I shall refer to the parties whose intentions are to count as its 
u authors. 11 
Consider the constitutional dictate that no state "deny to any per­
son within its jurisdiction the equal protectiion of the laws" (Amend­
ment XIV, Sec. 1 ). According to one way in which c 'original intent" 
has been applied, we must consider the authors' very specific inten­
tions: the constitutionality of a practice is determined by whether the 
authors of the provision had the specific practice in mind and 
intended to forbid or permit that specific practice. Some theorists 
have argued, for example, that racial segregation in the public schools 
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is compatible with the equal protection clause because its authors did 
not intend the provision to forbid racial segregation in public schools. 
These theorists give evidence to show that those who were responsible 
for constitutionalizing equal protection did not mean to outlaw racial 
segregation in public schools. They accordingly denounce the 
Supreme Court's decision in 8rou'1l v. Board of Education, which found 
that racially segregating public schools violates the clause.6 
Other theorists suggest that we should consider, not what specific 
applications the authors intended, but their more general intentions. 
It might be suggested, for example, that the authors of the fourteenth 
amendment intended its provisions to provide a practical solution to 
the social and political problems attendant upon the abolition of chat, 
tel slavery. The authors might well have assumed that the racial segre, 
gation of public facilities was compatible with that aim. That is, they 
might have thought that their more spedfic and more general inten, 
tions were compatible. But, if they were mistaken about that, and a 
court is guided by the authors' more general intentions, then the court 
would presumably endorse the Brown decision. So, how we under, 
stand "original intent" in this respect, too, can make a great difference 
to the implications of intentionalism. 
How can. we decide which type of" intention" counts? One would 
hope that a plausible rationale for the general approach would uni, 
quely justify a particular version of the theory. Reasons have occa, 
sionally been suggested for constitutional interpretation based on 
"original intent." But the rationales do not help. 
It has been suggested, for example, that intentionaUst interpretation 
is warranted by the precept that wills, contracts and other legal 
"instruments" should be read so as to implement the intentions of 
their authors. We should observe that this argument fails to eliminate 
the ambiguity of appeals to "original intent." It helps us to identify 
neither the parties whose intentions count nor which of their states of 
mind are to be counted. So it fails to provide us with a coherent the, 
ory of interpretation. Until that need is met, the call for intentionalist 
interpretation is incoherent. 7 
IV.] udicial Re.stTaint 
It has also been suggested that courts should limit their interpretative 
reasoning to strictly historical, value ... free inquiries into ccoriginal 
intent," so as to avoid u imposing" their own values on the Constitu, 
tion. This practice is associated with the notion of cc judicial restraint." 
This reason for appealing to ccoriginal intent" assumes that properly 
conducted intentionalist interpretation is always flatly historical, 
involving n o  exercise of judgment regarding values. But consider the 
constitutional prohibiti!on against taking private property for public 
use without "jus� compensation" (Amendment V). Courts are duty-
7
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bound to apply this provision and thus to decide in particular cases 
whether just compensation was given. But the Constitution supplies 
no measure of just compensation. How, then, are courts to apply this 
provision? lf the Constitution requires jusr compensacion, then a court 
must identify principles of justice in compensation that are sppro­
priate to the context of the case.5 This presumably involves making 
what Bork refers to as .. value choices." 
The just compensation clause example shows that intentionalist 
interpretation need not be value-free. Since the founding of the 
Republic, the Constitution has explicitly demanded just compensa­
tion. If that is what the Constitution has from the start required. it 
would seem that, if anything could reasonably be regarded as "origi­
nally intended," it must include just compensation when private 
property is taken for public use. But a court cannot possibly deter­
mine what this entails without reasoning about justice in compensa­
tion - without making whatever judgment is required to identify the 
appropriate principles. 9 
More to the point, constitutional decisions based on (say) "framers 
intentions" that were never incorporated into the Constitution - and 
which may in fact conflicr with what the Constitution actually says -
would seem anything but "restrained." 
We have just considered a version of so-called "judicial restraint" 
that concerns constitutional interpretation. Other versions advocate 
.. restraint" in the application of the Constitution. The difference is 
most easily shown by using an example: Thayer's famous "rule of 
administration" advocating extreme judicial deference to the 
legislature.10 
Thayer understands that the judicial review of legislation is quite 
limited in scope. Courts may not initiate reviews, but may conduct 
them only within the context of litigation in which constitutional 
questions arise. Nor are reviewing courts to function as a third legisla­
tive chamber. concerned with the wisdom or prudence of legislation. 
Judicial reviews exclusively concern the constitutional limits of legisla­
tive authority, not how well the legislature exercises its authority. 
Given Thayer's conventional understanding of the proper scope of 
judicial review, one might expect him to hold that a court engaged in 
review should seek a well-grounded understanding of the relationship 
between the Constitution and the legislation under review. This 
would presumably require a court to interpret not only the legislation 
but also the scope and limits of the legislature's authority under the 
Constitution. Thayer insists. however, that courts should nor ask gen­
erally what the Constitution means, but that they should ask on other 
grounds whether the legislation is to be treated as if it were 
constitutional. 
This is made clear by Thayer•s explicit distinction between a federal 
court's proper approach to state and federal legislation. Thayer says 
8
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that courts reviewing legislative enactments by state governments 
should be guided by .. nothing less than" the "just and true interpreta­
tion" of the federal Constitution {p. 155 ). But the same does not hold 
when courts review federal legislation. According to Thayer's rule of 
administration, courts should net1er declare federal legislation uncon­
stitutional unless its conflict with the Constitution is "beyond reaso­
nable doubt. "11 
That is a demanding condition. It might be impossible for courts 
following the rule ever to declare federal legislation unconstitutional. 
Judges might confidently believe, on excellent grounds, that a congre� 
sional enactment is unconstitutional, but they might simultaneously 
believe that their excellent reasons for regarding the legislation as 
unconstitutional still leave room for rational doubt. 12 
Most important, the judicial judgment that a legislative enactment 
violates the Constitution might be sound without satisfying Thayer's 
requirement that it exceed reasonable doubt. This version of "judicial 
restraint" thus requires courts deliberately to refrain from enforcing 
the Constitution. 
Thayer's rule requires substantial justification. Unless there is some 
doubt about the respect that courts should show the Constitution, it 
is unclear how they can legitimately refrain from applying and enforc­
ing it, at least when they are reasonably confident of its meaning. So 
it is important that Thayer suggests some reasons for his rule, such as 
the following: 13 
( 1) Unless the courts limit nullification to violati!ons of the Consti­
tution that are "plain and clear, ... there might be danger of the judi­
ciary preventing the operation of laws which might produce much 
public good" (p. 140). 
The point is put quite tentatively, perhaps because the argument as 
given is incomplete. For, when courts nullify federal legislation, they 
can block harmful as well as useful laws. We are given no reason to 
believe that following Thayer's rule would do more good than less 
deferential rules, or even that it would do more good than harm. But 
the argument might be bolstered. For example, it might be held that 
the best measure of the general welfare is provided by the best 
approximation of majoritarian decision making that is available; that 
this is a popularly elected legislature; and therefore that the policy of 
judicial deference to a popularly elected legislature is likely to best 
serve the general welfare. 
The question we must ask is not whether these claims are sound 
but what they have to do with constitutional adjudication. The bol­
stered argument assumes that the fact that a judicial policy for dealing 
with constitutional cases would promote the general welfare provides 
a justification for courts' implementing: the policy. But this would 
seem true only if courts are authorized to adopt policies that promote 
the general welfare in such cases. If we assume that a court's primary 
9
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function is to interpret and apply the law, then the argument is 
unsound, unless the relevant law authorizes courts to act as Thayer 
recommends. 
The context is constitutional adjudication, and the relevant law is 
constitutional. The question, then, is whether there is any constitu­
tional ground for supposing that courts are deliberately to aim at serv­
ing the general welfare, and to decide cases on that basis. The only 
plausible ground is the Preamble's statement that the Constitution is 
established in order to promote the general welfare, among other 
objectives. But this reasoning would not explain why courts should 
adopt policies to serve the general welfare but that they should not 
require that federal legislation promote the general welfare. Indeed, 
the reasoning would suggest that courts may base decisions generally 
on service of the general welfare - which is just what champions of 
"judicial restraint" deny. 
The newly reconstructed argument appears to commit a variant of 
the fallacy of division, which involves attributing a property to a part 
just because it is a property of the whole. From the premise that ser­
vice of the general welfare is a justifying aim of the Constitution as a 
whole, the argument infers that service of the general welfare is prop­
erly used as an objective by courts in developing strategies for adjudi .. 
cation. That is a dubious inference, for it ignores the fact that the 
powers of the federal judiciary, like those of the federal legislature and 
executive, are given by the Constitution, not by the considerations 
that are claimed to justify the Constitution.. 
This is not to say that a justifying aim of the Constitution is irrele­
vant to constitutional adjudication. It is relevant to understanding the 
Constitution. When courts interpret the Constitution,, they should 
construe it so that it serves its justifying aims. We shall return to this 
idea below. Now let us return to the reasons Thayer gives for his 
deferential rule. 
(2) The courts should insure udue obedience" to the federal legisla­
ture's authority. If its authority is ufrequently questioned, it must 
tend to diminish the reverence for the laws which is essential to the 
public safety and happiness" (p. 142). 
As I have suggested, one question we may ask is whether judicial 
deference to the legislature is a constitutionally permissible strategy. 
This argument seems to ground an affirmative answer on the plausible 
notion that the judiciary shares responsibility to make the constitu­
tional system work. But the argument assumes extraordinary circum .. 
stances. It suggests that, 1by rigorously enforcing the Constitution, 
courts might undermine respect for federal law. It assumes that fed­
eral rule is fragile and that judicial deference can significantly bolster 
federal authority. It may be difficult for us now to regard the federal 
government as fragile, but the idea might have seemed more plausible 
when Thayer wrote, less than thirty years after the Civil War.14 The 
10
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argument is, however, limited by those outdated assumptions. 
( 3) .. The interference of the judiciary with legislative Acts, if fre­
quent or on dubious grounds, might occasion 50 great a jealousy of 
this power and so general a prejudice against it as to lead to measures 
ending in the total overthrow of the independence of the judges, and 
so of the best preservative of the Constitution" ( p. 142 ). 
This reasoning also concerns the judiciary's responsibility to help 
make the system work. Thayer fears that (e.g.) "frequent" judicial 
enforcement of constitutional limits on the federal legislative author­
ity might provoke Congress to exercise its considerable constitutional 
power over the federal courts in such a way as to destroy the judicial 
independence that is prescribed by the Constitution itself. In short, 
rigorous judicial enforcement of the Constitution might be 
self-defeating. 
This reasoning resembles Learned Hand's rationale for judicial 
review .15 The irony is that Hand argues for review, whereas Thayer 
argues against it.16 Hand writes: 
There was nothing in the United States Constitution that 
gave courts any authority to review the decisions of Con­
gress; and it was a plausible - !indeed to my mind an 
unanswerable - argument that it invaded that 'Separation 
of Powers' which, as so many then believed, was the condi­
tion of all free government. (pp. 10-11 ) 
The Constitution does not explicitly give courts the authority to nul­
lify federal legislation that is found to be unconstitutional. Some 
believe that the authority might nevertheless be inferred from the 
Constitution. Does Hand disagree? The first part of the passage that is 
quoted above suggests that he does, and the second part seems to 
reinforce the point by framing an objection to judicial review. But 
Hand's subsequent reasoning implies the contrary. 
Hand appears at first to accept the argument that judicial review 
encroaches on the federal legislative power and thus violates the "sep­
aration of powers," that is, the prindple that power should be divided 
among separate branches of government so as to prevent its becoming 
dangerously concentrated. But his reasoning is opaque. ls the argu­
ment supposed to show that judicial review violates the Constitution 
because it violates a principle to which the Constitution is committed? 
Or is it supposed to show that judicial review is undesirable because it 
violates a principle of free government? The "unanswerable" argu­
ment might show that judicial review is politically objectionable with­
out implying that it is unconstitutional. 
Surprisingly, Hand continues as if the "unanswerable,, argument is 
in fact answerable! He argues that the federal courts properly assumed 
the power of judicial review in order to nkeep the states, Congress, 
and the President within their prescribed powers" (p. 15). If they had 
not done so, Congress would inevitably have dominated the federal 
11
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government. The practice of judicial review inhibits such a concentra­
tion of power. 
It was not a lawless act to import into the Constitution 
such a grant of power. On the contrary, in construing writ­
ten documents it has always been thought proper to 
engraft upon the text such provisions as are necessary to 
prevent the failure of the undertaking. (p. 29) 
Hand thus concludes, in effect, that the judiciary's encroachment on 
legislative discretion reinforces rather than undermines the separation 
of powers. 
This reflects the generally recognized point that an ,effective separa­
tion of powers involves some interdependence among the branches of 
government. Separation must be combined with "checking" to pre .. 
vent a dangerous concentration of governmental power. Furthermore, 
the Constitution does not mandate a strict separation of powers; it 
explicitly provides for some "checks and balances.'' So, contrary to 
Hand's initial suggestion, its encroachment on the separation of pow­
e·rs provides neither a constitutional nor an independent political 
objection to judicial review. 
V. The "Counter-Majoritarian Difficulty" 
Thayer suggests one further, more positive argument for his rule .. 
When he explains that it refers to "that reasonable doubt which lin­
g:ers in the mind of a competent and duly instructed person who has 
carefully applied his faculties to the question," he says: 
It must indeed be studiously remembered, in judicially 
applying such a test as this of what a legislature may rea­
sonably think, that virtue, sense, and competent knowl­
edge are always to be attributed to that body. The conduct 
of public affairs must always go forward upon conventions 
and assumptions of that sort. •It is a postulate,' said Mr. 
Justice Gibson, •in the theory of our government . . .  that the 
people are wise, virtuous, and competent to manage their 
own affairs.' (p. 149, second emphasis added) 
The last part of this passage suggests that the Constitution embodies 
political principles favoring government by elected representatives, 
and that those principles argue against interference by an unelected 
federal judiciary. 
Thayer's suggestion is similar to Alexander Bickel's famous conten­
tion that judicial review is "counter-majoritarian." 11 Because judicial 
review "thwarts the will of the representatives of the actual people of 
the here and now," Bickel says, it is "a deviant institution in the 
American democracy" (p. 18). The 0undemocratic" character of 
judicial review (p. 17) is supposed to argue for limiting such interfer­
ence with the operations of representative government. 
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How are we to understand this argument? Both Thayer and Bickel 
appreciate that the Constitution neither prescribes nor permits unres­
tricted representative government. It prohibits many decisions that 
might be· made by elected representatives. The constitutional system 
has various "counter,majoritarian" features and is not unqualifiedly 
committed to representative democracy. So, even if judicial review 
clashes with principles of pure representative goveTnment, that would 
not show that it clashes with the principles of the system that we in 
fact have. 
Our discussion has taken a significant turn. Until we considered the 
separation of powers, we might have been viewing the Constitution as 
a collection of independent clauses. That approach is rejected when 
we consider principles to which the Constitution may be committed 
by virtue of its general character. It is rejected in particular by those 
who agonize over judicial review because they see it as a "deviant" 
institution in our system. Without sympathizing with their specific 
worries about judicial review, one can welcome the comprehensive 
approach to constitutional interpretation that their argument repres­
ents. It supposes that the Constitution has an overall character, on the 
basis of which doctrines can be attributed to the Constitution even 
when they cannot be found in particular provisions. 
Reasoning of this generic kind has led theorists to claim that the 
Constitution confers rights upon individuals that are not explicitly 
recognized in the document. An example is provided by Bork's own 
view of free speech. is 
The First Amendment says that "Congress shall make no law ... 
abridging the freedom of speech." This right requires interpretation. 
It is plausible to suppose, for example, that Congress can legitimately 
regulate and thus abridge speech during its deliberations, and that 
"the freedom of speech" to which the First Amendment refers simply 
does not include some speech, or speech in some contexts. Bork 
infers from comparable examples that the provision requires interpre­
tation. He claims thart none can be based on original intent because 
the framers had no coherent theory on the subject. 
As we have seen, Bork holds that courts should nullify decisions 
made by the legislature only when they "dearly" violate the Constitu­
tion; in other words, courts should defer to the legislature whenever 
the Consrtitution is unclear. One would therefore expect him to hold 
that, as the constitutional protection of speech is unclear, courts 
should never nullify legislative interference with speech. The upshot 
would be a null theory of constitutionally protected speech. 
Bork rejects so extreme a position. He argues that we can treat 
speech as one of a number of "secondary or derived" rights, which 
are conferred 
for the sake of a governmental process that the Constitu­
tion outlines and that the Court should preserve. They are 
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given to the individual because his enjoyment of them will 
lead him to defend them in court and thereby preserve the 
governmental process from legislative or executive defor­
mation. ( p. 1 7) 
The relevant "process" is not far to seek. Bork maintains that the 
Constitution provides for a system of "representative democracy" (p. 
23 ), and he proposes to base an interpretation of the First Amend­
ment on the need to protect speech for the sake of an effective system 
of representative government. 
Bork notes that freedom of speech can be thought to have a great 
range of benefits to the individual and society. Deploying his skeptical 
premise again, however, he argues that courts may legitimately recog­
nize only the "discovery and spread of political truth" because the 
recognition of other benefits involves, for example, "ranking forms of 
personal gratification" (p. 25 ). He argues that a judge can legitimatdy 
recognize only two categories of .. political truths": "values that are 
protected by constitutional provision from the reach of legislative 
majorities" and, outside that protected sphere, "whatever result the 
majority reaches and maintains at the moment" (p. 30). He concludes 
that speech is protected by the Constitution only if it explicitly con­
cerns governmental behavior, policy, or personnel, and provided that 
it does not advocate any violation of the law. No other speech is pro­
tected by the First Amendment - not science, literature, or the par­
ental counseling of children. This could be called a minimalist theory 
of constitutionally protected speech. It is, however, an example of 
.. judicial restraint." 
Bork's approach to the First Amendment makes use of an impor­
tant idea that had been suggested by his colleague at Yale, the consti­
tutional scholar Charles L. Black, Jr. Black ugued that the "structures 
and relationshiips" prescribed by the Constitution require the 
enforcement ot rights in addition to the rights that are specified in the 
Constitution.19 But Bork's use of Black's suggestion turns it upside 
down. Bork comments candidly: 
The first amendment indicates that there is something spe­
cial about speech. We would know that much even with­
out a first amendment, for the entire structure of the Con­
stitution creates a representative democracy, a form of 
government that would be meaningless without freedom to 
discuss government and its policies. fr,eedom for political 
speech could and should be inferred even if there were no 
first amendment. ( p. 23) 
Bork holds that the main body of the Constitution confers the right 
to ,engage in a limited sphere of political speech, and his approach to 
reading the First Amendment yields nothing more, despite its broad 
language. He thus reduces the specified right of free speech to an 
implied right, rather than adding the latter to the former. Thus, Bork 
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interprets the First Amendment so char, by his own admission. ic 
makes no difference whether we have it in the Constitution. On his 
theory, the First Amendment's protection of speech does no work; it 
is an empty shell. Such a theory is mterpretacively perverse. 
The problem stems from another inconsistency within Bork's posi­
tion. He had insisted, earlier in the same paper, that the Constitution 
provides for a system of "Madisonian democracy," which encom­
passes not only representative government but also limits on it. The 
"structure of the Constitution" embodies a Madisonian "model of 
government," which "is not completely . . .  majoritarian" (p. 2 ). "The 
model has also a coumer-majoritarian premise, . . .  for it assumes there 
are some areas of life a majority should not control. (p. 3 )  This seems 
descriptively more accurate than Bickel's "majoritarian" model. 
But Bork forgets the Madisonian model when he discusses the First 
Amendment. Instead of asking, as he does, what procections for 
speech are required to make a system of representative government 
work (which here is eqt1ivalem to asking what is required to make a 
majoritarian system work), he should, in consistency, ask what pro­
tections for speech are required to make a Madisonian democracy 
work, that is, to implement a constitutional plan that involves respect­
ing minority interests as well as majority preferences. 
VI. Proee.ss .. Based Interpretation 
The comprehensive approach to constitutional interpretation is 
important despite its misuse by Bickel and Bork. Many jurists and 
scholars hold, in effect, that constitutional interpretation must be 
guided by a theory about the character of the institutions that the 
Constitution prescribes. Unfortunately, their theories are usually 
limited to vague talk about "majoritarianism" or udemocracy." 
John Ely goes one step towards rectifying this. situation. He main­
tains that the Constitution is overwhelmingly concerned with the pol­
itical . ,processes" of representative democracy, rather than with "sub­
stantive" values.20 The problem of judicial review is to understand the 
nature of those processes and the limits that are placed upon them by 
the Constitution. Ely's approach is to interpret unclear aspects of the 
Constitution by reference to a theory about the overall character of 
the processes that the Constitution prescribes. 
According to Ely, the Constitution prescribes "participation" in 
two ways. First, the basic political processes are supposed to be parti­
cipatory. Access to them is supposed to be guaranteed. That is the 
point behind constitutional protections for, say, speech and voting: 
they are meant to help keep the political processes "open" ( p. 105). 
The Constitution's emphasis on uprocess11 instead of ''substance" 
has a negative aspect too: it prescribes "legitimate processes, not legit­
imate outcomes" (p. 1 0 1  ). Referring to the benefits that result from 
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go\·ernmental activities, Ely writes: 
The constitutionality of most distributions . . .  cannot be 
determined simply by looking to see who ended up with 
what, but rather can be approached intelligibly only by 
attending to the process that brought about the distribu­
tion in question - by what Robert Nozick has called a 
"historical" (as opposed to an "end-result0) approach. (p. 
1 36.) 
According to Ely, the Constitution calls for "participation" in a 
second respect: governmental decisions that determine who partici­
pates in the benefits produced by governmental activities must take 
into account the interests of all. 
By following Nozick, Ely suggests that representative democracy is 
valuable because it is inherently fair. Ely appears to reject any instru­
mental valuation of representative democracy. But he provides no 
support for that position. 
Ely's analysis of the idea that the Constitution stands for represen­
tative democracy halts prematurely. He says, in effect, that we must 
understand the Constitution in terms of the political principles that 
are presupposed by its institutional design. But these require 
clarification. 2 1  
Ely's general strategy of interpretation for the Constitution is to 
seek guidance from the political principles for which it stands. This 
suggests that we should interpret the principles of representative 
democracy, in turn, by reference to the more basic values that they 
can be understood to serve. 
The reasons for regarding representative democracy as a good thing 
are neither obvious nor uncontroversial. It is unclear whether the 
processes of representative democracy are supposed to be inherently 
fair, so that whatever comes out of them is morally acceptable; or 
should be regarded as reliable means to other ends; or both. We need 
to understand what values representative democracy is supposed to 
serve and how its processes are supposed to serve them. Only then 
will we be in a position to interpret unclear aspects of the Constitu­
tion so that those values will be served. 
I can suggest one reason why analysis stops. Like Bork, Ely is 
uncomfortable with the idea that constitutional interpretation might 
depend upon judgments about value.22 To Ely, as to Bork, the idea 
that the Constitution stands for the virtuous principles of representa­
tive democracy is so widely accepted that it may not seem like value­
laden interpretation. Ethical skepticism discourages further inquiry 
into underlying values. Theoretical inquiry is inhibited, and the result 
is an abortive exercise in constitutional theory. 
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VII. Concluding Comments 
My points so far have been primarily negative. I have considered 
aspectS of constitutional theory that warrant our regarding it as 
underdeveloped. I will end with some brief. constructive comments 
focusing on the following neglected issue: 
What relation must a theory have ro the Constitution if it 
is to be a theory of the Constitution? 
I want to suggest that a theory which is meant to guide interpretation 
and applicarion of rhe Consriturion should seek and should be capa, 
ble of grounding justifiable decisions. 
By "justifiable" I mean the following. Many of the routine activities 
of law, including its enforcement mechanisms, involve practices that 
stand in need of justification which goes beyond showing that they are 
authorized or required by legislation or common law. People who act 
in the name of the law do things to others that require justification 
when they are not done in the name of the law. They use coercion and 
force, they lcill and maim, they deprive people of liberty and valued 
goods. It is implausible to suppose that the mere fact that something 
is done in the name of the law automatically confers upon that activ, 
ity the full justification it needs. The conclusion I draw is that most 
things done in the name of the law, including judicial decisions, stand 
in need of full,fledged moral justification.23 
Judicial review regulates activities within our political system. Like 
legal decisions generally, constitutional decisions require justification. 
Insofar as constitutional interpretation makes a difference to deci, 
sions, it requires justification too. 
This suggests that the interpretation of law generally, and cons ti tu, 
tional interpretation in particular, should not be value,free, but 
should be conducted so as to promote the moral justification of deci, 
sions that turn upon them. Theories of interpretation should be of 
such a character, and theories of the Constitution should be related to 
it in such a way, as to render the Constitution justifiable, so far as that 
is possible.24 
Notes 
1 This a revised version of a paper presented at Catholic University, September 4, 
1987, initiating its Lecture Program on Phil.osophy and the U.S. Constitution. 
Some sections incorporate material from my "Constitutional Interpretation and 
Original Meaning," Social Philosophy & Policy 4 ( 1986) 75,101, "Substance. Pr°' 
cess and Outcome in Constitutional Theory," Cornell Law Re\liew 72 ( 1987) 
745-764, and "A Preface to Constitutional Theory," Northern Kentucky Uniuersity La 
Re\liew 15  ( 1988) 459-4 77. 
2 Robert H .  Bork, "Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems," 
Indiana Law Re\liew 47 ( 197 1 )  1-35. 
17
Lyons: Ambiguity, Incoherence and Evaluation in Constitutional Theory
Published by Digital Commons @Brockport, 1988
Ambiguity, l11lCOherence ana Emluation in Consrirurional Theory 2 1  
> So� of the more penttrating critiques of intt'ntionalist intt'rpt't'tation may be 
found in Paul Brest. "The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding ... 
Bosron Uni"ernry La"· R�riew 60 ( 1980) 204-238. and Ronald Dworkin. ''The 
forum of Principle." Neu· York Un1t.ersiry La"• Rt'>iN• 56 ( 1 98 1 )  469-500. 1 
knolA.' of no comparable attempts to justify or defend the theory. 
And. if the laner, does this mean that we are to be guided by the intentions of 
the indi\liduals who performed that function in the various states. or instead by 
the intentions of the stace.s themselves? For it "'85 the states that f.ormally ratifi«I 
the Constitution. 
s Who would be included? Only those eligible to vott in statt ratifying proce­
dures? All citmns, whether eligible to vote or not? AU residents? Would � 
include women? Slaves? Native Americans? 
6 See, e.g., Raoul Berger, Got.enmenr by Judiciary ( 1977). 
It cannot not be followed except when the same results emerge from the applica­
tion of all plausible interpretations of "original intent" (including, of course. all 
ways of combining the diverse intentions of those whose intentions must com­
bine to form a collective intent). 
s The text oversimplifies matters by ignoring the relevance to a courts' decision of 
judicial precedent interpreting the provision as well as other commitments taken 
by the legal system on the issue of justice in compensation. But a court's under­
standing of justice in compensation is presumably an ingredient of its complex 
judgment in such a case. 
9 The example suggests, further, why some insist upon valuc-frtt constitutional 
adjudication .. The idea that an interpretation which involves the exercise of ethi­
cal judgment "imposes" the values of the judge �ms to assume (as did Bork) 
that ethical judgments arc inherently arbitrary. 
10 James B. Thayer, "The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitu­
tional Law," Haroord Law Review 7 (1893) 129-156. 
1 1  Ibid., p. 146. The rule is formulated in a variety o f  ways by Thayer as well as by 
those he quotes. The differences among formulations make no difference here. 
12 Sec Charles Black, The Peof'le and the Court ( 1960), p. 203. 
13 All of the reasons that Thayer suggests arc presented in quotations from others' 
writings, but he appears to endorse each point thus made. 
t4 It should be noted that, unlike the first argument for Thayer's rule, this one and 
the next suggest grounds for courts' treating state and f edcral legislation 
differently. 
is Learned Hand, The Bill of Righrs ( 1958), Lecture l. 
16 Hand insists on limits to review, but not as Thayer docs. When he says that "it 
was absolutely essential to confine the power to the need that evoked it," his 
sentence continues, ccthat is., it was and always has been necessary to distinguish 
between the frontiers of another 'Department's' authority and the propriety of 
its choices within those frontiers" (p. 29). 
11 Alexander Biiclcel, The Lea.st Dangerous Branch ( 1 962), p. 16. 
18
Philosophic Exchange, Vol. 19 [1988], No. 1, Art. 1
http://digitalcommons.brockport.edu/phil_ex/vol19/iss1/1
22 Dat1id LJOnS 
18 "'Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems," pp. 1 7-35. 
19 Char� L. Blaclc. Jr . •  Scnu:tuTe and Relacionship in Con,mcuuonal Lau· ( 1969). 
zo John Hart Ely. Democracy and Discrusc ( 1980). chap. 4. 
21 Ely recognizes that some constitutional provisions cannot be fitted into his the­
ory of how the Constitution should be interpreted. His recommendations ignore 
these complications. That difficulty for this theory is separate from the one that 
l discuss in the text. 
zz This is made clear by chapter 3 of Democracy and Distrwc. 
H See David Lyons, "Derivability, Defensibility, and the Justification of Judicial 
Decisions," The Monist 68 ( 1985) 325-346. 
H l feel conmained to add, however, that it seems to me by no means crystal clear 
that our constitutional system was initially justifiable. l mean to question the jus­
tifiability of those "original" decisions insofar as they preserved chattel slavery 
and promoted the displacement and slaughter of Native Americans. If, for 
example, slavery was likely to cease earlier and Native American peoples and ter­
ritory were likely to be respected more under British rule (both arguable propo­
sitions ), then it is unclear that the political gains made by seeking independence 
and establishing our system, as initially constructed, justified those original 
decisions. 
19
Lyons: Ambiguity, Incoherence and Evaluation in Constitutional Theory
Published by Digital Commons @Brockport, 1988
